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By KENNETH B. GERMAIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nix v. Jordan,I the plaintiff, an automobile passenger,
was injured in a two-car crash. She filed suit against the driver
and the owner' of the other car, but did not sue her husband,
who was the driver of the car in which she had been riding.
However, the two defendants impleaded the plaintiffs hus-
band as a third-party defendant, seeking "contribution in the
amount of one-half of any judgment which may be rendered in
favor of the Plaintiff against these Defendants and Third Party
Plaintiffs."' The case proceeded to trial, and pursuant to an
instruction addressing the "joint and concurrent negligence" 5
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Rutgers Univer-
sity; J.D. 1969, New York University School of Law.
I For related articles on recent Kentucky cases involving joint tortfeasors, see
Germain, Kentucky Law Survey-Remedies ("The Effect of Releasing One of a Num-
ber of 'Joint' Tort-Feasors"), 64 Ky. L.J. 233, 243-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Germain, Releasing "Joint" Tort-Feasors], commenting upon Sanderson v. Hughes,
526 S.W.2d 308 (Ky. 1975); Germain, Kentucky Law Survey-Remedies ("Wrongful
Death Recovery Where a Joint Tortfeasor is a Statutory Beneficiary"), 63 Ky. L.J. 77.7-
82 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery], commenting
upon Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
2 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975). For clarity, it should be noted that Jordan was the
plaintiff at the trial court level.
3 The family-purpose doctrine was relied upon without contest. Id. Note that as
between the two named defendants neither "contribution" nor "apportionment"
would be appropriate because of the vicarious liability relationship inter sese. See
Daniel v. Patrick, 333 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. 1960). Indemnity, however, would be
possible. See discussion in text accompanying notes 15-25 infra.
532 S.W.2d at 762, apparently quoting from the third-party complaint.
5 The phrase "joint and concurrent negligence" represents an improper amalgam-
ation of concepts:
The term "joint tort-feasor" really should be reserved for situations involving
concerted action or conspiracy between or among more than one tort-feasor,
whereas the term "concurrent tort-feasor" is aptly applied to situations in-
volving two or more tort-feasors whose wholly independent acts concurrently
caused an indivisible injury. Because true concurrent tort-feasors are often
"joined" as defendants in modem lawsuits, the term "joint tort-feasors" has
been used generally by courts, albeit somewhat incorrectly, in reference to
both types of tort-feasors.
Germain, Releasing "Joint" Tort-Feasors, supra note 1, at 244 n.61 (emphasis in the
original). For purposes of this article the clearer term "co-tortfeasor" will be used.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65
of the two drivers, the jury came in with a verdict of $7,000
against the two party defendants; the court entered judgment
for the plaintiff against them. Thereafter the court awarded the
defendants contribution against the third-party defendant (the
plaintiff's husband) for one-half of the judgment and costs
pursuant to Kentucky's contribution statute, which provides
that "[c]ontribution among wrongdoers may be enforced
where the wrong is a mere act of negligence and involves no
moral turpitude."'
The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial judge had
improperly refused to instruct the jury of its right to apportion
liability between the defendants and the third-party defendant
if both drivers were viewed as negligent.7 The Kentucky Su-
preme Court rejected this contention and affirmed the judg-
ment of the trial court. In the opinion, Justice Palmore rea-
soned:
Though it might otherwise make good sense to apply the
principle of apportionment among joint tortfeasors without
exception, the authority for Orr ... derives from a statute
(KRS 454.040) which cannot fairly be construed that liber-
ally. Literally, the statute permits apportionment only
£ Ky. REv. STAT. § 412.030 (1970) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
The Court of Appeals observed that the defendants had, in effect, sought to
amend the third-party complaint for this purpose. 532 S.W.2d at 762 n.*. This raised
an issue recognized in an earlier case but specifically "reserved" for later discussion.
We reserve for a future time the question, not raised by the parties to this
case, whether on a claim for contribution (in a situation in which the plaintiff
has not sued both tortfeasors in one action) a jury should be allowed to
determine that the liability of the tortfeasors, as between themselves, is
several and unequal so as to preclude contribution.
Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 596 n.1 (Ky. 1967).
Such apportionment was arguably authorized by the Court of Appeals' decision
in Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970), which construed Kentucky's apportion-
ment statute. This statute, KRS § 454.040 provides:
In actions of trespass the jury may assess joint or several damages against
the defendants. When the jury finds several damages, the judgment shall be
in favor of the plaintiff against each defendant for the several damages,
without regard to the amount of damages claimed in the petition, and shall
include a joint judgment for the costs.
It should be noted that "this statute is probably the only one of its kind in the United
States ... in the rest of the states it is assumed that 'no rational division can be made'
regarding the responsibility of joint tortfeasors." W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 52, at
316 n. 39 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]; Germain, Wrongful Death
Recovery, supra note 1, at 778 n.4.
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against "defendants," which necessarily means joint defen-
dants.'
The opinion went on to explain that since the plaintiffs hus-
band was a defendant only with respect to the third-party com-
plaint, the apportionment statute was inapplicable to him, and
thus an apportioned several verdict was not authorized. Justice
Palmore further explained that although in Orr v. Coleman
there was only one party defendant at trial, apportionment had
been sanctioned because of a pretrial settlement with the other
co-tortfeasor. He harmonized the cases in this fashion:
[In Orr] the public policy of encouraging settlements justi-
fied our construing KRS 454.040 to include as "defendants"
joint tortfeasors who probably would have been defendants
but for the fact that they had bought their peace. Certainly
the settlement itself attests the active assertion of a claim,
whereas in this case, by contrast, it is obvious that the plain-
tiff had not asserted any claim against her husband, the third
party defendant."0
Thus, in Nix, "apportionment" under Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes § 454.040 [hereinafter cited as KRS] was held improper,
and the defendants vere left with "contribution" under KRS
§ 412.030.
The direct upshot of Nix is to allow KRS § 454.040 to be
sidestepped by any plaintiff who chooses to avoid the possibil-
ity of several, apportioned verdicts against co-tortfeasors in
order to protect against uricollectibility of part of the total
judgment due to insolvency," or to insulate co-tortfeasors who
are relatives or friends of the plaintiff from bearing more than
a pro rata share" of the total judgment. 3 Of course, this can
Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. 1975).
455 S.W.2d 58 (Ky. 1970). See supra note 6.
Id.
I For example, a plaintiff, by refraining from suing an insolvent co-tortfeasor, can
avoid the possibility that the jury, under a KRS § 454.040 instruction, would render
"several" verdicts thereby unwittingly depriving the plaintiff of part of his total dam-
ages. Cf. Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery, supra note 1, at 781.
" For example, a wife who suspects that a jury might decide that her uninsured
husband, one of two co-tortfeasors, was 80 percent causally negligent, would choose to
sue only the other co-tortfeasor, thereby completely avoiding the anticipated dispro-
portionate result, and insulating her husband from having to pay more than 50 percent
of the total judgment by "contribution" under KRS § 412.030.
11 The term "total judgment" is meant to include the taxable court costs, since
1976]
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be rationalized as furthering the generally accepted policy of
allowing plaintiffs to choose whom to sue and from whom to
seek payment.'4
IX. CLARIFICATION OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS
The Nix case provides a convenient opportunity to re-
examine the basic and important terms "indemnity,"
"contribution," and "apportionment." This is advisable be-
cause of the rather complex interaction of these frequently used
terms, especially in light of the peculiar Kentucky apportion-
ment statute.
A. Indemnity
Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co.,'5 an oft-cited in-
demnity case, expressed the gist of the indemnity concept:
Where one of two parties does an act or creates a hazard and
the other, while not concurrently joining in the act, is, never-
theless, thereby exposed to liability to the person injured, or
was only technically or constructively at fault, as from the
failure to perform some legal duty of inspection and remedy-
ing the hazard, the party who was the active wrongdoer or
primarily negligent can be compelled to make good to the
other any loss he sustained."8
In determining that indemnity was appropriate in that case,
the Court explained that the fuel company employee's
"primary, efficient and direct" negligence in failing to replace
a manhole cover was responsible for the hotel company's expo-
sure to liability. It emphasized that there was a difference in
degree and kind of negligence:
Both were in fault but not the same fault toward the party
injured. The employees of the two companies were not acting
these are subject to contribution under KRS § 412.030. See Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d
530, 536-37 (Ky. 1974). Indeed, such costs are assessed "jointly" even where otherwise
"several" verdicts are rendered in KRS § 454.040 cases, since that statute specifically
calls for "a joint judgment for the costs."
" See PRossER § 47 at 296-97.
224 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1949).
" Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 65
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jointly or concurrently or contributorily in committing the
tort. They were not in pari delicto.'7
Later in the opinion it was pointed out that although indem-
nity and contribution both were based upon the "idea of
equalization of burden," indemnity was a common law con-
cept to be applied where the parties were not in pari delicto,
whereas contribution was allowable only as a statutory matter
and applicable even where the parties were in pari delicto. 5
The references to in pari delicto, which is ordinarily thought
of as meaning "of equal fault,"19 were fairly apt in distinguish-
ing indemnity situations from contribution situations. How-
ever, that term may be quite inappropriate when the concept
of apportionment is considered."
The precepts of Brown Hotel with regard to indemnity
have continued into recent cases," including one in which it
was stated that contribution-as opposed to indemnity-
applies where the parties are "in pari delicto, that is, one
equally at fault from the standpoint of concurrent negligence
of substantially the same character. 2 2 Indeed, it has even been
held that indemnity is a jural right which could not
constitutionally be foreclosed.2
In accordance with Kentucky's view of the indemnity-
contribution dichotomy is a recent law review article, wherein
the author, having referred to the quasi-contractual nature of
indemnity in the pure tort' context and to the primary-
17 Id.
11 Id. at 168. Indeed, the very reason that contribution had to be statutorily au-
thorized was the legal maxim, "In pari delicto, potior est conditio defendentis" (In
equal guilt, the position of the defendant is stronger), i.e., in a suit for contribution
the defendant would prevail. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B, comment a
(Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972).
" BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1957) defines it as "In equal fault; equally
culpable . . . in a case of equal fault or guilt."
See text accompanying notes 32-51 infra.
21 See, e.g., Cassidy v. Sullivan & Cozart, Inc., 468 S.W.2d 260, 261-62 (Ky. 1971);
Adams v. Combs, 465 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Ky. 1971); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson
County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky. 1968).
21 Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1965)
(emphasis added).
21 Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Jackson County Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 438 S.W.2d
788, 790 (Ky. 1968), relying upon Ky. CONST. § 54 (1891).
24 Indemnity can also be a result of contractual agreement.
1976]
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secondary distinction, emphasized the qualitative aspect of the
indemnity concept:
There must be a difference in the quality of fault, however;
it is not enough that there is a gross disparity in the quantity
of each party's negligence.2
Thus understood, indemnity should not conflict with the terms
of contribution and apportionment.
B. Contribution
Contribution is an old concept, which, in Kentucky,26 as
elsewhere, was not accepted as part of the common law par-
tially because of the in pari delicto maxim and the related
unclean hands doctrine. 27 Relief eventually came, generally in
statutory form. Kentucky's contribution statute, KRS §
412.030,2 expressly authorizes contribution, and has been in-
terpreted to require contribution on a pro rata basis. Thus,
each co-tortfeasor ideally should be held responsible for the
same share of the damages as every other co-tortfeasor. 21 The
policy behind contribution has been clearly stated:
Basic principles of fairness demand that all the parties liable
for a tort contribute to the compensation of the injured party.
Contribution permits the loss to be equitably distributed
among all persons responsible for the injury, so it does not
rest on one alone.
3 0
Therefore contribution is appropriate where the parties are in
pari delicto-at least in the qualitative sense.
21 Comment, Contribution and the Distribution of Loss Among Tortfeasors, 25
AM. U.L. REv. 203, 210 (1975) (emphasis added) [hereinafter referred to as Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors]. Accord, United Air Lines v. Wiener, 355 F.2d 379, 402
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); PROSSER § 51 at 313. This all fits com-
fortably with the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (Tent. Draft No. 18, 1972),
which, after setting out the basic indemnity rule in terms of unjust enrichment of
the indemnitor, provides six specified types of situations, each of which could be
explained in terms of a "primary-secondary" distinction or a similar rationale.
2 See Brown Hotel Co. v. Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 224 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1949).
' See Contribution Among Tortfeasors, supra note 25, at 213.
Quoted in text accompanying note 7 supra.
See Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137, 143 (Ky. 1965);
accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(1)-(2)(Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970);
Contribution Among Tortfeasors, supra note 25, at 232.
31 Contribution Among Tortfeasors, supra note 25, at 204.
[Vol. 65
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In sum, it has been stated quite clearly that under Ken.
tucky law there is a distinct difference between contribution
and indemnity:
Indemnity, in essence, is shifting the entire loss from one tort
feasor who has been compelled to pay it to the shoulders of
another who should bear it instead. Contribution, on the
other hand, distributes the loss among the tort feasors by
requiring each to pay a share of the injured party's loss.
3 '
C. Apportionment
Apportionment, as applied to "indivisible"32 injuries, is a
strange creature conceived by the Kentucky legislature. The
apportionment statute, KRS § 454.040, was originally enacted
in 1839, thereby antedating the contribution statute by nearly
a century.3 In modern times it has been the subject of many
somewhat confusing judicial opinions. 4 As elsewhere sug-
gested,35 and emphasized herein, this statute is of great signifi-
cance.
It is important to note how the apportionment statute bas-
ically functions. First, although it expressly applies to actions
of trespass, "[flrom time immemorial it has been held applic-
able to personal injury actions based on negligence. ' 36
Second, apparently only a jury may enforce the provisions
of the section. 3 Although this is perfectly in keeping with a
3, V.V. Cooke Chevrolet, Inc. v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 451 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Ky.
1970).
11 The word "indivisible" is set in quotation marks because it represents a contra-
diction in terms: if the injury is originally viewed as "indivisible" in that joint liability
is justifiably imposed upon two or more concurrent tortfeasors, it appears anomolous
to turn around and apportion liability.
" Compare KRS § 454.040, (earlier codified as Carroll's Code § 12, originally
enacted as Ky. Acts ch. 1214, § 2, at 166 (1839)) with KRS § 412.030, (earlier codified
as Carroll's Code § 484a, originally enacted as Ky. Acts ch. 190, § 1, at 877 (1926)).
" See, e.g., Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762 (Ky. 1975); Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d
530 (Ky. 1974); Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
31 See Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery, supra note 1, at 778-82; Park,
Comparative Negligence is Here Now, 39 Ky. BENCH & BAR 19 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Park, Comparative Negligence].
11 Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970).
37 Malone v. Wright, 364 F.2d 818, 820 (6th Cir. 1966):
It is . . . Kentucky's rule that whether the damages shall be in gross or
separate is left to the jury . . . . In this case, the District Judge sitting
without a jury committed no error in assessing the damages against the
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literal interpretation of the statute, it tends to add another
tactical consideration in deciding whether to demand a jury
trial.
Third, the statute authorizes38 the jury to "assess joint or
several damages," but provides no standard for guidance. Cu-
riously, none of the reported cases suggest any standard for jury
use. Instead, the instructions, either oral39 or written," merely
inform the jury of its option41 without ever indicating the func-
tional consequences. Perhaps this lapse can be attributed to
the courts' tacit beliefs that juries will not choose to issue sev-
eral verdicts except where the co-tortfeasors should be held
responsible for unequal amounts. In fact, one court has indi-
cated that the very "purpose of the statute is to permit the jury
to assess different amounts against each defendant," thereby
concluding that the apportionment statute was not applicable
where the co-tortfeasors were equally responsible." However,
defendants jointly.
Cf. Parker v. Redden, 421 S.W.2d 586, 596 n.1 (Ky. 1976).
Is The statute uses the word "may," which is statutorily defined as being discre-
tionary: "As used in the statute laws of this state, unless the context requires other-
wise: . . . 'May' is permissive." KRS § 446.010(10) (Supp. 1976).
11 See, e.g., the relevant instruction from S.W. Corum Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford, 511
S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1974), directing that if more than one of the defendants were found
liable to the plaintiff:
you may find in one lump sum against * * * (them) or any combination of
them, or you may state in your verdict what percentage of the cause of the
accident was attributable to each of said parties you may find against.
Id. at 222 (quoting the trial judge).
,0 See, e.g., the "form of verdict" submitted to the jury in Douglas v. Pottinger,
365 S.W.2d 725, 726 (Ky. 1962), wherein the jury had already been directed to find in
favor of the plaintiff:
We, the Jury, find for Rose Pottinger against
(a) Claude Douglas in the sum of $__, or
(b) Against Charles Fritts in the sum of $-, or
(c) Against Douglas and Fritts in the sum of $-, or
(d) Against Douglas in the sum of $-, and against Fritts in the sum of
Foreman
Notice that alternatives (c) and (d) are not carefully differentiated.
11 "[T]he proper instruction should authorize recovery against the defendants
either jointly in a single sum or separately in sums of different amounts." Daniel v.
Patrick, 333 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. 1960).
42 Miller v. Hammary Furniture Co., 299 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D. Ky. 1969) (Swin-
ford, J.), which relied somewhat dubiously upon Daniel v. Patrick, 333 S.W.2d 504,
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these hypothesized beliefs are betrayed in cases in which juries
have returned several verdicts indicating equal responsibility
on the parts of the co-tortfeasors.43 In these cases the question
arises why a jury chose several rather than joint liability, and
whether it is fundamentally fair for a jury to make this choice
without any judicial standard, since the several verdict could
very well be prejudicial to the plaintiff44-completely unbe-
knownst to the jury.45 Nevertheless, this seems to be the state
of affairs."
Fourth, whenever a jury does apportion damages, it must
do so according to the amounts of causation attributable to the
various co-tortfeasors. 47 Jury instructions may be in terms of
percentages or specific dollar amounts. 48 Costs, however, re-
main subject to joint judgment only, in accordance with the
express terms of the apportionment statute.
49
Finally, as pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
apportionment under KRS § 454.050 "constitutes a recognition
of comparative negligence." 5° However, as Judge James Park
507 (Ky. 1960) and more soundly upon Murphy v. Taxicabs of Louisville, Inc., 330
S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1959) and Central Passenger Ry. v. Kuhn, 6 S.W. 411, 447 (Ky.
1888).
,3 See, e.g., Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 536 (Ky. 1974); Brown Hotel Co. v.
Pittsburgh Fuel Co., 224 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Ky. 1949). Cf. Park, Comparative Negli-
gence, supra note 35, at 19: "Not only may the jury assess damages severally under
KRS § 454.040, but the jury is not required to assess damages between joint tortfeasors
on a 50-50 basis."
" "Several" verdicts are always inferior to "joint" verdicts from a plaintiff's view-
point, since, at the least, the plaintiff must demand payment from more than one
defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff is exposed to the risk of a defendant's insolvency or
other cause of uncollectibility (e.g., disappearance of a defendant and his assets). To
dramatize: Case 1: P obtains a joint verdict for $50,000 against D1 and D2. Case 2: P
obtains several verdicts of $25,000 each against D1 and D2. D1 becomes insolvent or
absconds with all of his property. In Case 1, P can recover the total judgment of $50,000
from D2 (who is left with a valueless contribution claim against DI); in Case 2, P can
only recover $25,000 from D2, and therefore loses half of his judgment.
Cf. Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery, supra note 1, at 781; Park, Comparative
Negligence, supra note 35, at 19.
1 In the reported decisions, there is no indication that the jury is ever told about
the difference in impact of joint as opposed to several verdicts.
1, The absence of a standard for jury guidance might even lead some attorneys to
claim a constitutional deprivation of due process or denial of equal protection.
11 Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 536 n.3 (Ky. 1974), discussed in relevant part
in Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery, supra note 1, at 779-81.
a See S.W. Corum Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford, 511 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Ky. 1974).
" Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 537 (Ky. 1974).
Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d 137, 143 n.4 (Ky. 1965).
19761
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later explained in a very insightful article, the comparative
negligence doctrine is now applicable only to the liability of
joint tortfeasors as defendants, since the usual type of compar-
ative negligence, which allows a plaintiffs negligence to be
balanced against a defendant's, has not yet arrived in Ken-
tucky
1
I1. Nix's IMPACT UPON THE INTERACTION OF KENTUCKY'S
CONTRIBUTION AND APPORTIONMENT STATUTES
Since Nix did not involve any issue of indemnity, its im-
pact is limited to the interaction of the other two relevant
systems affecting co-tortfeasors-contribution and apportion-
ment. Where a plaintiff joins all co-tortfeasors as defendants
in the basic lawsuit, the pre-Nix rules apply. The jury has
discretion to render either apportioned several verdicts or an
unapportioned joint verdict,52 in accordance with proper in-
", Park, Comparative Negligence, supra note 35, at 21. Judge Park's article con-
tains citations to the significant New York cases of Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 282
N.E.2d 288 (N.Y. 1972) and Kelly v. Long Island Lighting Co., 286 N.E.2d 241 (N.Y.
1972). In Dole, the New York Court of Appeals adopted a comparative negligence
approach among co-tortfeasors even though New York law does not recognize compara-
tive negligence as between plaintiffs and defendants. In Kelly, that same court ex-
plained that the apportionment mandated by Dole was to be effected on the basis of
the co-tortfeasors' allocable concurring fault or causal negligence. Later lower court
decisions of interest are Michelucci v. Bennett, 335 N.Y.S.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. 1972) and
341 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Liebman v. County of Westchester, 337 N.Y.S.2d
164 (Sup. Ct. 1972). Many case comments were published on the Dole case, e.g.,
Recent Development, 58 CORNELL L. REv. 602 (1973).
Another state which has had substantial experience with comparative negligence
among co-tortfeasors is Wisconsin, which for some time has used comparative negli-
gence principles between plaintiffs and defendants as a result of express statutory
provisions overriding the contributory negligence rules of the common law. More re-
cently, in Bielski v. Schutze, 114 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1962), the Wisconsin Supreme
Court adopted a comparative negligence rule for co-tortfeasors. A later case of impor-
tance is Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963).
As regards the eventual acceptance of plaintiff-defendant comparative negligence
in Kentucky, Judge Park concluded:
Should the evolving rules with respect to apportioning liability between joint
tortfeasors prove to be workable, it appears likely that there will be increased
pressure for legislative enactment of a plaintiff's comparative negligence law.
Park, Comparative Negligence, supra note 35, at 21. Moreover, in this regard the New
York experience, even though not complicated by an unusual statute like KRS §
454.040, may be worth watching.
52 Under Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Ky. 1974), when a jury apportions
a verdict it thereby automatically renders it "severally." See note 61 and text accom-
panying notes 60-61 infra.
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structions under KRS § 454.040. Moreover, in the event of a
joint verdict under these conditions, the normal rules of KRS
§ 412.030 also apply, thereby equitably distributing the dam-
ages among the various co-tortfeasors pro rata.53 However, if a
plaintiff sues less than all of the co-tortfeasors, then Nix comes
into play. Nix involved the simplest possible situation where
there were but two co-tortfeasors, only one of whom was sued
by the plaintiff." The resulting apportionment was found inap-
propriate, but contribution was deemed allowable. As noted
above, this allows an unsued co-tortfeasor who was more than
50 percent causally negligent to bear only 50 percent of the
plaintiff's damage recovery; it also insulates a plaintiff from a
several verdict against an insolvent party. Thus, the rule has
both pros and cons from a policy viewpoint, although from a
technical viewpoint it is probably correct. These views cer-
tainly find support in Judge Park's article:
By its terms, KRS 454.040 appears to apply only to a situa-
tion in which P has sued both X and Y [co-tortfeasors].
Obviously, the jury could not assess "joint * * * damages
against the defendants" if P had sued only X and not Y.
Nevertheless, there are some who have argued that KRS
454.040 applies even though P has sued only X, not Y ....
This result [P's recovering judgment against X only for that
portion of the damages caused by X's negligence] strikes this
writer as being unfair, since P may have a valid reason for not
suing Y. Y may be P's husband, and there may be a house-
gold exclusion in their policy [citation omitted]. It appears
fairer to permit P to sue X for the entire injury, and then put
the burden on X to file a third-party complaint for contribu-
tion.55
These views are susceptible to the criticism that Judge Park
and the Nix Court may have overemphasized the concept of
"fairness" in favor of the plaintiff, at least where the sued co-
tortfeasor's causal negligence was substantially less than the
unsued co-tortfeasor's. Furthermore, one may question the pol-
-" "[The right of contribution provided under KRS § 412.030 will be involved
even if P sues both X and Y, if the jury should elect to assess joint damages." Park,
Comparative Negligence, supra note 35, at 19.
" For an apt discussion of some more complex possibilities, see id. at 21.
Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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icy that allows matters such as the uninsured status and fami-
lial relationship to the unsued co-tortfeasor to affect the sued
co-tortfeasor adversely. Indeed, Judge Park, in discussing the
more complex cases in which the plaintiff has obtained a settle-
ment with one or more of the co-tortfeasors, seemed to realize
that the Nix Court's interpretation of KRS § § 454.040 and
412.030 left something to be desired:
[T]his writer suggests that the jury should be required to
determine and apportion the percentage of causation in every
case in which the jury has determined that a plaintiff is enti-
tled to recover as a result of joint negligence. If both tortfea-
sors have been sued by the plaintiff, then such a finding as
to percentage of causation is a prerequisite to any assessment
of several damages pursuant to KRS 454.040-on the other
hand, if the jury should determine to return a joint judgment
or there should be any question of contribution, a determina-
tion by the jury as to percentage of causation will be, at worst,
only surplusage which could be ignored without affecting the
underlying verdict. However, it appears likely that the Court
of Appeals will expressly hold that any right of contribution
should be based upon the jury's apportionment of causation
on a percentage basis."6
It is clear from the Court's decision in Nix that it preferred not
to follow Judge Park's suggestion that "contribution should be
based upon . . . apportionment." 57 This, of course, was to be
expected, as the contribution statute, which codified the equi-
table rule of pro rata adjustment, has had a settled interpreta-
tion for its entire existence of 50 years. Additionally, Judge
Park's suggestion that the jury should apportion causation in
every case in which a plaintiff was injured by the negligence of
co-tortfeasors was unlikely to be followed for a few other rea-
sons. One problem was involved in the Nix case itself, namely,
where there is only one named defendant, KRS § 454.040 does
I, d. (emphasis in original). Judge Park placed some reliance for his last state-
ment upon Donegan v. Denny, 457 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Ky. 1970), which, in what he
properly characterized as "an isolated statement," seemed to suggest that contribution
could be based on apportioned causation. Id. However, Judge Park overlooked a dia-
metrically opposed statement in Lexington Country Club v. Stevenson, 390 S.W.2d
137, 143 n.4 (Ky. 1965): "[fln a claim for contribution . . .[apportionment] appar-
ently is not authorized."
57 Park, Comparative Negligence, supra note 35, at 21.
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not literally apply. Second, and more significantly, Judge
Park's assertion that a finding of causal percentages where the
jury rendered a joint verdict "will be, at worst, only surplusage
which could be ignored without affecting the underlying ver-
dict"58 falls far short of the mark. Requiring a jury to think and
act in terms of an apportioned verdict would surely influence
that jury toward returning several verdicts, clearly a substan-
tial detriment to the plaintiff." Indeed, one of the holdings of
Cox v. Cooper"0 makes it virtually impossible for a jury to ap-
portion its verdict without rendering a several verdict:
[T]here can be little doubt that when the jury chooses to
apportion its award between or among joint tortfeasors their
respective liabilities become fixed and finally settled, as to
the plaintiff or plaintiffs .... 61
One final matter about Nix that deserves attention is
whether the Supreme Court was justified in distinguishing Nix,
where the plaintiff voluntarily pressed her claim against less
than all of the co-tortfeasors, from Orr v. Coleman, 12 in which
Id. (emphasis added).
, Oddly enough, the Court of Appeals has shown a peculiar preference toward
several verdicts under KRS § 454.040. See, e.g., S.W. Corum Hauling, Inc. v. Tilford,
511 S.W.2d 220, 223 (Ky. 1974), in which the Court was very lenient in handling an
objection to a rather unclear verdict form.
510 S.W.2d 530 (Ky. 1974).
" Id. at 536-37 (emphasis added). Moreover, in S.W. Corum Hauling, Inc. v.
Tilford, 511 S.W.2d 220 (Ky. 1974), where the claim was made that the instructions
were insufficient to apprise the jury that the percentages included in the verdict would
be used to apportion the award, the Court concluded:
We do not think the jury was required to be so informed. The instructions
formulated in Orr did not so inform the jury. We believe it is reasonable to
consider that jurors, as ordinary intelligent people, would understand that
the percentages of causation fixed by them would be determinative of appor-
tionment of damage liability.
Id. at 223-24.
It is true, however, that Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970), held that
a jury should be required to fix proportionate causation, but that case involved a
situation in which there was only one defendant-co-tortfeasor in the lawsuit since the
other co-tortfeasor had entered into a settlement with the plaintiff. Thus, neither the
defendant nor the plaintiff had reason to complain. Accord, House v. Kellerman, 519
S.W.2d 380, 384 (Ky. 1974). Note, however, that if there are two or more defendants'
remaining after one or more have settled with the plaintiff, the situation is more
complex. For Judge Park's views on this type of situation, see Park, Comparative
Negligence, supra note 35, at 21.
,2 455 S.W.2d 59 (Ky. 1970).
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the plaintiff had reached a settlement with and given a
"release" to one of the co-tortfeasors. In Nix the Court de-
fended its use of KRS § 454.040 in Orr despite its refusal to
apply it to the facts of Nix on the ground that the general
public policy favoring settlements "justified our construing
KRS § 454.040 to include as 'defendants' joint tortfeasors who
probably would have been defendants but for the fact that they
had bought their peace." 3 Thus, in two decisions explained in
terms of a principle of "literal" statutory construction, 4
radically different results were reached. Moreover, it could be
contended that a literal view of KRS § 454.040, which first
refers to "joint or several damages against the defendants,"
then refers to a several judgment "against each defendant,"
and concludes with a direct reference to "a joint judgment for
the costs," clearly contemplates that there be at least two de-
fendants in the lawsuit at the time that the case goes to the
jury. Under this analysis, Orr would be incorrectly decided
upon this point, but Nix would remain intact. 5
Perhaps an adequate explanation for the "literal" confu-
sion emanating from Orr and Nix can be gleaned from the
Court's indications that Orr deserved different treatment be-
cause settlements should be encouraged. Clearly, in the Orr
situation it makes some sense to use an apportionment ap-
proach,"6 since this provides an effective way of determining
how much is to be charged against a plaintiff who has settled
Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. 1975).
" Compare Justice Palmore's explanation of Orr in Cox v. Cooper, 510 S.W.2d
530, 536 (Ky. 1974) ("From a literal construction of KRS § 454.040. . . .") (emphasis
added), with his pivotal phrase from Nix v. Jordan, 532 S.W.2d 762, 763 (Ky. 1975)
("Literally, the statute permits apportionment only against 'defendants,' which neces-
sarily means joint defendants")(emphasis added).
Is Although Orr was a case in which more than one co-tortfeasor had actually been
sued by the plaintiff, who then, before the trial, settled and released one such co-
tortfeasor, there is no suggestion in Orr or in later cases that the Orr rule would not
apply similarly to cases in which a co-tortfeasor settled and obtained a release prior
to having actually been sued as a joint defendant.
" Although this may be the best approach-assuming that it does not abuse
applicable related legal principles-it is certainly not the only approach. For example,
the jury could be asked to assess the plaintiff's total damages and the judge could then
enter judgment against the sued co-tortfeasor for that amount less any amount already
received by the plaintiff in partial settlement, provided that amount was arrived at in
good faith and was reasonable. See generally Contribution Among Tortfeasors, supra
note 25, at 236-45.
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with the other co-tortfeasor, thereby obviating any demand for
contribution.67 However, the same could be said for the Nix
situation, thus affording the sued co-tortfeasor the same treat-
ment. The trial logistics would be the same since the jury
would be required to assess causal negligence as in the Orr
situation. The shortcoming under this approach is that the
plaintiff comes away with less than a full loaf, but that is only
because he chose to forego suit against a responsible party. The
benefit of this approach is in disallowing the plaintiff from
using a tactical maneuver to treat a co-tortfeasor unfairly.
Ultimately, there may be no better solution than to reiter-
ate 8 that there are major policy shortcomings embodied in
KRS § 454.040, justifying-alas, crying for-corrective
legislative action.
," According to Orr:
That objective [i.e., apportionment of liability] is not achieved when the
amount of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability is made to depend on the
amount for which the other has settled, and over which the nonsettling
tortfeasor may or may not have exercised any control. In such a case the
claimant gives up nothing by settling with the one, since he gets the balance
from the other. And if the nonsettling tortfeasor may then enforce contribu-
tion from the one who has settled, the purpose of the settlement is defeated.
Should we hold that to be the case there simply would be no more partial
settlements. The practical answer is that the jury should be required to
assess the total amount of the claimant's damages and fix the proportionate
share of the nonsettling tortfeasor's liability . . . .The trial court may then
compute the amount of the judgment to be entered against the nonsettling
tortfeasor, thus fixing his ultimate liability (and incidentally obviating any
question of or necessity for contribution).
Orr v. Coleman, 455 S.W.2d 59, 61 (Ky. 1970) (emphasis added). Accordingly, under
Orr:
[If] the jury assesses the percentage of causation on a basis of 80% to X and
20% to Y, [and] Y has previously settled with P for $10,000, [and] . . .
the jury finds that P's damages were $100,000 the judgment would be entered
against X for $80,000.
Park, Comparative Negligence, supra note 35, at 20. It should be noted that the
plaintiff in this example would get the $80,000 from X in addition to the amount he
received from Y in settlement.
" Cf. Germain, Wrongful Death Recovery, supra note 1, at 781.

